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I . INTRODUCTION
Computer systems are becoming more and more complex as faster and
more versatile computer hardware evolves. The resultant sophisticated
uses of the computer systems demand that programmers develop reliable
instructions to drive the computer systems. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the military where computers are being used increasingly as the
heart of sophisticated weapons systems such as real-time command control
systems which actually control their environments by receiving data,
processing data and returning results fast enough to affect the functioning
of their environments.
It is now the case that software costs (those costs related to
developing, testing, correcting and integrating all computer programs and
data descriptions used to operate, test, monitor and maintain the hard-
ware system) now exceed the hardware costs in most complex systems. We
now see huge programs with perhaps over a million words of code.
The technical literature abounds with articles about quality control
procedures, test methodologies and techniques for measuring and predicting
reliabi lity—most applied to the hardware systems. Though not complete,
the theory is certainly developed to such a state that highly reliable hard-
ware can be achieved. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about computer
software. Until recently the software has received only modest attention
and, as a result, software development is still more an art than a science.
This is the case despite the fact that the influence of the software may
well dominate the hardware when- considering overall system reliability .
Consider, for example, the possible consequences if a real-time military
command control system crashes because of a software deficiency while enemy
units are being tracked. Even a few moments delay to restore the targets
on a video output display could be vital. In this case a software deficiency,
just like a hardware failure, could incapacitate a key component of our de-
fense structure at a critical time.
The lack of attention given to software quality control has resulted,
predictably, in products which are characteristically laden with software
errors even after they have been released to customers for operational use.
The failure of the software product to perform as required results in the
loss of customer confidence for the entire system.
How can software quality be improved so that the customer's confidence
in the software subsystem can be restored? We seek to provide at least a
partial answer to this question in this report. As with hardware, a quanti-
tative measure for evaluating software must be used if a meaningful assess-
ment of software quality is to be made. More is needed than a subjective
assessment of program performance and program deficiencies if quality is to
be described in other than general terms such as "acceptable" or "unacceptable.
This report defines a quantitative measure of software quality^and mathema-
tical models for estimating that measure of effectiveness are presented in
Chapter 4. The data requirements and data collection procedures are discussed
in Chapter 3.
A numerical measure of software quality will enable us to evaluate a
software subsystem, but, by itself, the measure will do nothing to improve
the quality of the software delivered to the customer. To accomplish this,
more effort and resources must be expended in the design, development and
integration phases of the software. The causes of "software unreliability"
must be determined, and steps must be taken to alleviate the contributions
of the identified causes of software problems.
Certainly, the software contractor must accept much of the blame for
a poor quality software product. The contractor is responsible for the
code that is created, and he must exercise management control over the pro-
duct. Nevertheless, the customer can assume a more active participation in
the development of the software which should help assure that his delivered
software is acceptable. This can be accomplished by completely spelling out
exactly what the software must be able to do and by requiring that sufficient
software testing be carried out to demonstrate adequately that the software
conforms to its performance specifications. In addition the customer can
require strict management control of the software during its development. In
Chapter 5 we discuss the role the customer can play to improve the quality
of the software which is delivered to him.
Finally, we point out the need for further work in the area of software
quality control to validate the mathematical models and to improve the test
procedures.
II. SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
2. 1 Measu re of Performance
In order to provide a meaningful assessment of software quality,
quantitative methods of evaluating software must be developed. Tradition-
ally, quality assessments have been mere subjective evaluations of soft-
ware based on the frequency of program deficiencies. However, subjective
evaluations for software do not seem consistent with the use of the rather
sophisticated methodologies used to measure the quality of interacting
hardware. For complex computer systems, consisting of the hardware, soft-
ware and human operator subsystems, the most widely accepted and most
meaningful measure of performance is total system reliability
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defined as
the probability that every subsystem performs within specification limits
for the time and under the conditions of intended customer use. Thus there
is an obvious need to measure the reliability of the software subsystem.
If no software reliability specification is explicitly stated, one must be
determined from the specification for the total system. A study of the cost-
benefit trade-offs would then determine the reliability apportionment.
2.2 De finitions
Although software reliability appears to be the most appropriate mea-
sure of performance, there are definitional problems because the meanings
of such words as software reliability and software failures are not entirely
obvious by analogy with the corresponding hardware reliability concepts.
Our software reliability study will therefore begin with definitions of these
basic terms.
Definition 1: A software failure occurs when an input is made or a command
is given and the software subsystem does not respond as required.
It is generally obvious when a program has failed to function as re-
quired. The failure may be manifest in many ways. A complete stoppage of
the system may occur; output values may fail to lie within acceptable tol-
erance limits of the true values; or troubles with interactive hardware,
e.g., erroneous video displays or incorrect navigation, may be experienced.
On the other hand, there will surely be some cases of controversy as to
whether or not a failure has occurred, and some failures will go undetected.
Detection of failures is, to a large extent, a subjective decision which
must be made by the operators or the test personnel, hopefully on the basis
of objective criteria such as performance specifications In actual practice,
failure detection depends on an operator's observation, so, in effect, a soft-
ware failure is what an operator says is a failure.
After failures are detected some programmer must inspect the program
and locate the causes of the failure. Logical or clerical errors in coding
may be found to be guilty of producing the incorrect results. When software
errors are located, action should be taken to correct the errors to prevent
recurrence of the failures. Obviously, the correspondence between software
errors uncovered and software failures detected is not necessarily one-to-one.
Many errors may occur without a failure being detected, and a single detected
failure may be a result of several software errors. Also, a software failure
may be reported that is in fact no software failure at all, but rather an
operator or hardware deficiency.
Because of the difficulties involved with determining a correspondence
between the number of software failures and the number of errors, we choose
not to define software reliability as a probability of error-free performance
Instead, we opt for definitions (depending on the type of data observed)
based on the observed diffi culties--fai lures . We offer two different
definitions of software reliability depending on whether the observed data
are quantitative, such as times between failures, or qualitative, such as
"run success" or "run failure."
Definition 2 (Quantitative Data): Software reliability is the probability
that the software subsystem will operate without a single failure for a
specified length or time under given conditions.
Definit ion 3 (Qualitative Data): Software reliability is the probability
that the software subsystem will perform without failure for an entire run
under given conditions.
The latter definition requires further comment about the definition
of the word "run." In some cases a run might be taken to mean the operation
of the software under a particular set of input combinations. Alternatively,
it may mean an operation of the software subsystem for a fixed length of
time, or it may take some other meaning. Although admittedly somewhat vague
at this juncture, the meaning of the word "run" should be clear in a given
application from the context in which it is used.
2.3 Classification of Errors
The definition of software reliability fails to distinguish between
different classifications of failures. No doubt, software failures differ
with respect to their impact on the system. The more severe failures may
result in the failure of a mission, while less critical failures may only
cause nuisances or limitations which have little effect on a mission's
success. It may be appropriate to classify failures according to their
impact on the system and to define reliability in terms of a particular
class of failures, or perhaps to apply some weighting scheme to failures
so that the more critical failures are weighted more heavily than are the
minor failures. Although appealing, such an approach is not entirely satis-
factory because of the subjective nature of the assignment of weights. In
this paper we make no distinction between failures. One can still apply
the models that we present to a particular category of failures by simply
redefining a software failure in terms of a given failure classification.
2.4 Analogy with a Hardware Reliability P rogram
Because the theory of hardware reliability is developed to a relatively
advanced state, it is natural to try to learn about software reliability by
borrowing from the hardware reliability theory. There are certainly many
similarities between the two, but a few important differences have prevented
a simple direct application of the hardware techniques to software. Never-
theless, much insight can be obtained as to what kinds of things should be
done with software by studying the areas of a hardware reliability program.
MacWilliams [17] summarizes those areas as follows:
1. Define, observe and record failures at the system, subsystem
and component levels.
2. Determine the statistical behavior of failures and develop a
mathematical model for failures.
3. Isolate the principal causes of failure.
4. Determine the quantitative dependence of component failure
rates.
5. Determine achievable limits of component reliability as a
function of the variables which can be controlled in the
devel opment.
6. Develop a theory to combine component reliabilities into sub-
system or system reliability.
7. Optimize the distribution of unreliability by considering the
component reliabilities as a function of cost and by considering
the abilities to compound component reliabilities into sub-
system and system reliabilities. Apportion the overall
system reliability among subsystems in such a way as to achieve
the most economical attainment of the desired system reliability.
These same steps are desired for a software reliability program. Cer-
tainly we require a quantitative knowledge of software failure statistics,
including causes and dependencies, and a mathematical model of the failures.
Also, a method of compounding the reliabilities of software modules into a
"total software reliability" would be desirable, as would a theory for appor-
tioning effort among software modules. Unfortunately, difficulties result
when one tries to apply all steps of a hardware reliability program to soft-
ware. Even when one attempts to apply the first few steps, basic differences
between hardware and software failures create a need for new mathematical
models. Let us examine those differences.
2.5 The Random Nature of Software Failures
Hardware failures occur randomly with time as the hardware deterio-
rates. However, there is no degradation of software, and there is no
physical mechanism which generates software failures. Once all errors are
removed, the software is 100 per cent reliable and will remain so forever,
provided no program changes are made. What then accounts for the random-
ness of software failures?
Different input combinations result in different requirements of the
software. The paths traversed within a software program depend on the part-
icular input combinations, and each path can be thought of as containing
possible software bugs waiting to be discovered. Without correction, the
same errors will occur each time a specific logic path is traversed. If
the errors result in an observable software failure, the given failure can
be reproduced at will, or it can be avoided by operator control of the input
combinations. Therefore, software failures are functions of the input com-
binations—not random functions of time. However, in practice, input combin-
ations are chosen in a somewhat random fashion, and the resultant effect is
that errors are uncovered and failures are observed at random. It is in this
sense that we talk about the random occurrence of software failures. Thus,
although there are conceptual differences between software failures and
hardware failures, software failures are surely the analog of hardware fail-
ures that we should use to measure software reliability.
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2_i 6 __Res trictions on the Mathematical Reliability Models
In Chapter 4 we present several mathematical models for software
reliabi lity--all based on software failure data. Because of the absence
of degradation of software and the "find and fix" actions that are taken
when errors are discovered, the models assume a reliability growth as a
function of total test time. The models consider the reliability of the
software subsystem alone. No attempt is made to model the interactions
of hardware-software, operator-software or hardware-software-operator.
These are all important considerations, but software reliability being
in the embryonic stage that it is requires us to focus singly on it at
this time. This does not preclude the combination of software reliability
with hardware and operator reliabilities to obtain an estimate of overall
system reliabi lity
.
Our models treat the software subsystem pretty much as a black box
in the sense that the internal structure of the software is completely
ignored. Again, better reliability models could probably be developed if
that structure were considered. This is a refinement that would probably
follow once a good understanding of software reliability is obtained and
expertise is developed.
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III. SOFTWARE TESTING AND DATA COLLECTIONS
3.1 Introduction
A numerical estimate of software quality can be no better than the
data from which it is determined. To estimate software reliability, de-
tailed information about the frequency of failures, the times that
failures occur and the severity of the failures is needed. Furthermore,
if there is to be reliability growth, the causes of the failures must be
identified, and corrective action must be taken. Only through good,
representative failure data can reasonably accurate mathematical models
of software reliability be developed and reliable predictions about soft-
ware quality be made.
The software test effort has already become the single most costly
step in most software production processes. The high cost of testing
combined with the high reliability requirements of complex systems demands
that efficient test methodologies be developed. It also requires that the
data reporting system be established early in a software test program so
as not to lose valuable information.
3.2 Stages of Software Testing
The development of software is a "bottom-up" procedure. First,
modules are coded. These are then combined to form functional groups
(processes) which, in turn, are integrated into the software subsystem.
The "total system" is then formed by integrating the software, hardware and
operator subsystems. This development procedure is depicted in Figure 1.
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Software testing should be conducted throughout each stage of devel-
opment. At the lowest level, the primary purpose of testinq is to discover
the crude errors such as compilation errors and syntactical errors. Debug-
ging at this level is certainly much simpler than at the process or subsystem
levels. Because modules are usually of manageable size, having perhaps only
a few functions, module check-out which is nearly exhaustive would be pos-
sible in many cases. The module failure data are useful for determining
statistical estimates of quality which could be employed to establish addi-
tional test requirements for the module.
When several modules are integrated to form a process, or when several
processes are integrated to form the software subsystem, problems surface
which had previously gone undetected. This occurs because the complex inter-
actions between modules could not have been tested previously as the indivi-
dual modules were separately checked out. Unfortunately, the complexity of
the module interactions precludes the direct use of module reliability esti-
mates to determine the software subsystem reliability, or even the process
reliabilities. The multitude of branching possibilities in a typical process
or software subsystem and the complex interactions seem, at this time, to
make infeasible a computation of subsystem reliability from a knowledge of
module reliabilities as is done with hardware systems in a "series/parallel"
sort of analysis. For these reasons, tests must be run, and failure data
must be collected during and after the integration stages.
At the beginning of the integration stage many bugs will likely be
experienced and frequent failures will occur. As with the module failure
data, this information is what is needed to estimate present reliability and
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to provide guidance as to the extent of testing which must be performed.
Later in the integration stage, after the program has been debugged
to a point that it will run for some time before failing, the software
should be subjected to some sort of simulation test by a functional test
program to make sure that a software subsystem which may perform without
failure does indeed do the job for which it was designed. This provides
an opportunity to test the software in a complete system with hardware
and operator interfaces. It is an ideal time to collect failure data and
to measure the reliability of the software subsystem. At this stage, pro-
per design of test plans and rational methods for validating programs be-
come critical. Anything like exhaustive testing is virtually impossible
because the number of possible cases may total in excess of several million.
Finally, after the software subsystem has been judged to be acceptable
and all performance requirements have been demonstrated, it is turned over
to the user for field tests. If usual experience prevails, the supposedly
good software now suffers a completely new set of failures induced by the
unique characteristics of actual operation not considered in previous tests.
The closer the test environment simulates the operational environment, the
more accurate will be the reliability estimate made at the end of the inte-
gration stage.
It is the reliability estimate of the system in the operational en-
vironment that is of interest to the user. An estimate of this reliability
is needed to determine if the software is of sufficient quality to allow
user access. If the field tests are unsatisfactory, the software may have
to be returned to the developer for corrective work and more testing. The
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release of an unreliable product will result in the loss of users' confi-
dence.
3.3 Test Methodology
We have discussed the importance of the test effort, and we have men-
tioned that software testing is becominq the single most costly element in
the development of software for complex systems. Because of the importance
and expense of software testing, efficient test procedures must be used.
Despite the need, no general systematic test methodology is available which
can be applied to test each program to determine whether or not all software
components perform as required.
There have been some recent attempts (see, for example, London [16] and
King [12]) to develop procedures for actually proving the correctness of
programs. Presently, these procedures are only applicable to relatively
small programs written in special languages. There seems to be little hope
that generally applicable methods for formally proving programs logically
correct can be developed for large complex programs.
With the large number of input combinations that need to be examined,
it would be desirable to have a computer program that could be used to check
out a software subsystem by exercising all options and all branches within
the subsystem through all the feasible ranges of values. The tester would
only have to supply parameters to such a program and the automatic computer
test program would do the rest of the work. Jelinski and Moranda [10] point
out that this is not possible because even with our latest generation of com-
puters with a nanosecond cycle the number of possible input combinations in-
23





the processing time exceeds the astronomical limit of 10 seconds of
computer time. Thus, a completely automatic computer test program does
not appear to offer a feasible solution to the software testing problem.
Certainly, software checkout could be improved if assistance could be pro-
vided by some sort of computer program tester. Jelinski and Moranda [10]
report of such a tool, called a "program testing translator", under deve-
lopment at McDonnell Douglas Company. The translator, currently designed
to run only with FORTRAN programs, when exercised with a software program
will count the number of times each branch in the program was executed by
a given set of input conditions. It also performs a number of counts on
various types of statements. These counts provide a good indication of
which branches have been checked out for a given range of values, thus
providing assistance toward achieving reliability. Such a "program testing
translator" does not completely solve the test problem, even for FORTRAN
programs, but it is certainly a useful tool for testing software.
The question of how a set of input conditions should be selected to
test a software program remains to be answered. The answer depends on many
factors such as:
(1) the size of the program being tested,
(2) the number of tests that can be run,
(3) the frequency of use of the various functions comprising
the program, and
(4) the criticality of the functions to mission success.
Because failures do not occur randomly with time, but rather they occur be-
cause of the traversals of different paths through the program, the tests
must include enough cases to exercise as many paths as possible consistent
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with the resources available for testing and the reliability objectives.
><o doubt, many of the software errors would probably be detected if input
combinations were selected at random. In fact, such a procedure is often
used in the early stages of a test program to detect the crude errors
which account for a large percentage of all of the errors. However, if
the tests are to demonstrate that all functions perform as required and
that each performance specification is satisfied, random selection of tests
is not satisfactory. Furthermore, if the test data are to be useful for
estimating software reliability, the test cases must consider the criti-
cality of the various functions and the frequency of occurrence of the func-
tions during program operation. Otherwise, the testing would not be repre-
sentative of actual operation. This would result in a bias in the estima-
tion of software reliability.
In summary, the input combination sequences selected for testing soft-
ware should be determined by analysis of the performance criteria, the
frequency of use and the impact of the functions on mission success. The
tests should be conducted in an environment which simulates as closely as
is economically feasible the conditions that would be experienced in actual
operational use. Efficient testing requires that the tester be knowledgeable
about the use of the system and be cognizant of all performance specifica-
tions, both implicitly and explicitly stated. Keezar [11] suggests that a
sufficient, though cost-effective number and variety of input messages must
be examined in order to exercise the critical system limits, interface areas,
timing factors and storage allocations. Also, a number of likely occurrences
of illegal system inputs should be used in an attempt to make the system fail
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Finally, the tests must be strictly controlled, reproduceable and documented
in depth.
3.4 Data Collection
In order that maximum information be acquired from each test run, good
detailed data must be collected. Although everyone expresses interest in
software reliability, very few people seem interested in documenting software
failures. At least it has been historically true that very little software
failure data have been collected that are useful for an analysis of software
reliability. This want for useful data is partially responsible for the
poor quality of delivered software. It has also handicapped the theoretical
development of mathematical models of software reliability. What software
models that exist have been developed primarily on the basis of what appear
to be plausible assumptions about failures or errors. The real test--the
scrutiny of a model in light of actual data--is yet to be made in most cases.
All too often, the reliability analyst has been asked to work in a virtual
vacuum without any usable data.
In addition to the reliability analysis, data are required for the
detection and correction of errors. Certainly, one objective of running
software tests is to uncover bugs so that the reliability of the software
will grow as cumulative test time increases. Without complete documentation
of failures this reliability growth may not take place. The data also pro-
vide a measure of the extent to which the software performs as required, and
it provides us with a measure of the amount of additional testing that is
requi red.
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What data should be collected? If the data are to be useful for all
of the above purposes--reliabi lity estimation, error detection and correc-
tion, and software validation—the necessary information includes the
following:
(1) a description of the test run (including the input data),
(2) the date and time of the run start,
(3) the date and time of the failure incident,
(4) the date and time of the system restart,
(5) the date and time of the normal termination of a run,
(6) the impact of the failure on system performance,
(7) the traffic load and possible environmental influences, and
(8) a detailed description of the problem.
For the single purpose of a reliability analysis, where we are con-
cerned with the times between failures, we are mainly interested in the
time trace of starts, failure occurrences, restarts and normal run termina-
tions. All that is needed in addition is a determination of the type of
fai lure--whether it be a software deficiency, a hardware malfunction, or
an operator error. An example of the sort of time trace that is desirable

















where S- = time run i started
T. = time that run i terminated
F. = time of the i failure
R. = time of the i restart
FIGURE 2
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The following information can be constructed from a time trace:
(1) the distribution of the time between failures,
(2) the mean time between failures,
(3) the probability of operation for a given interval of time
without failure,
(4) the mean time to restore,
(5) the probability of a successful run, and
(6) software availability.
Since we define software reliability as the probability of a failure-free
run for a given time interval when data are times between failures, this
information is exactly what we are interested in.
In some cases we may wish to ignore some of the characteristics of
the data and use it solely to classify a given test as a success or a fail-
ure. This may be necessary if it is too costly to install automatic re-
cording equipment, or if it is impractical to have an observer make the
continuous observations required to provide a time trace. We then must be
satisfied with simply counting the number of failures at the ends of discrete
periods of time or to count the number of failures in a given number of test
runs
.
The remainder of the information that we record is that needed to vali-
date the software and to classify, detect and correct errors. When collecting
data, we must keep in* mind that any information that would enable a programmer
to recreate the problem, to locate the cause of the problem or to correct the
problem should be provided. This requires a complete description of the test
run, the manner in which the problem was manifest and the impact of the pro-
blem on system performance. A statement about the recovery or bypass procedures
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and a computer core dump would also be useful for the subsequent examination
and corrective action that must take place. The failure report should be
followed by a supplementary report of the remedial action that was taken to
patch the program. The documentation associated with a given failure should
be considered complete only after the remedial action report has been issued
We have implied that failure data are useful for debugging the soft-
ware, for validating the software and for estimating software reliability.
We concentrate on the latter item in the next chapter. Several mathematical
models for software reliability are presented, some of which require quanti-




Quantitative criteria are needed to assess the duality of software.
We have remarked that the software failure data provide the most important
indication about the duality of the software. It is rarely, if ever, the
case that any large complex software, subsystem is completely debugged.
Therefore, the strongest statement that can usually be made is a statement
about the probability of a failure-free operation - a reliability statement.
In this chapter we present several mathematical models, each of which
attemnts to provide an estimate of the reliability of the software sybsystem,
In most cases reliability specifications for the total system are
established in advance of software development. Sometimes the software
subsystem reliability specification is stated explicitly; other times
it must be determined from the overall system reouirement. In all cases,
it is handy to have some reliability specification against which to measure
progress and to determine test reouirements . We must have some realistic
goal to shoot for so that we can judge when the software is of sufficient
duality to allow user access. The difference between the attained re-
liability and the reliability objective should be the feedback information
which is used to determine the extent of the testing which must follow.
Because of the magnitude and complexity of some software sub-
systems it mav be desirable to apportion the software reliability specifica-
tion into module or nrocess reliability reouirements. There is a relatively
well developed theory for the reliability apportionment with regard to
hardware, but, as yet, little work in this area has been done with soft-
ware. We do not address the nroblem of reliability apportionment, nor do
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we comment about what the reliability specification should be. These are
imnortant areas which depend primarily on the user's needs, the criticality
of the system and economic considerations. We will assume that explicit
nrovisions for software reliability have been established.
In the work that follows we assume that the software development
is at a noint where configuration control has been instituted so that
all subseouent changes incorporated into the software must be formally
approved and documented. This should occur by the time that the processes
are integrated to form the software subsystem. During earlier stages the
failure behavior of software will probably be so erratic that no meaningful
mathematical model could be developed. For the purpose of predicting
operational reliability, the appropriate stage of testing over which
failure data should be collected is the period of actual system operation.
However, reliability estimation is needed prior to that stage so that
nroaress can be measured and test criteria established.
We make no distinction between software failures as to criticality.
Certainly, a failure which yields the system inoperable is more important
than one which merely causes a nuisance. Nevertheless, classification
of software failures according to severity reauires, to a large degree,
a subjective assessment. We prefer to restrict our attention to the
problem of estimating reliability where all failures are weighted eaually.
If failures were classified as to severity, nothing would prevent one
from using the models that we present for the case where a software failure
has been redefined to include only those failures of a given criticality
or worse.
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The primary data that we reouire is the time trace of software
operation discussed in the previous chapter. In some cases the actual
times between failures will not be necessary. Instead, qualitative data
such as "success" or "failure" may suffice.
We assume that the reader has some familiarity with the terminology
used in reliability analysis. Consequently , many standard reliability
terms will be used without definition or elaboration. A review of the
basic theory of reliability is presented in ADpendix A.
4.2 A Hardware-Oriented Approach
We consider first an approach towards developing procedures for
estimating software reliability which borrows heavily from the techniques
of hardware reliability analysis. It is natural that we should try to
exploit the vast reservoir of reliability theory already well established
and validated for hardware systems (especially since we have observed
analogies between software and hardware failures). When applied to
software, many of the ideas of hardware reliability theory carry over
without change. There are, however, some differences which reouire that
some caution be taken. For example, we have already discussed the
differences in the nature in which we speak of the random occurrence of
failures. Furthermore, unlike hardware, there is no degradation of
software due to age. If all bugs were removed from the software, it
would have a reliability of one thereafter. Finally, because of the
debugging that takes place as failures occur and errors are detected,
there is a natural reliability growth that accompanies testing and
operation. This reliability growth results in changes in the dis-
tribution of times between failure and conseauently changes in the
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reliability function itself as cumulative test time increases. Later
in this section, we comment about steps that should be taken to accomodate
those changes.
The procedure that we describe follows that suggested by SCHNEIDEWIND
in [24] and [25], where he applied a hardware reliability approach in an
analysis of the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) software. We outline

























As indicated by Figure 3, the first step is to run tests and assemble
the failure data. The failures must be classified as to cause; whether they
be operator, hardware, software or unknown. In addition, if there is to be
a distinction as to severity, the software troubles are to be divided into
groups according to criticality. This step yields a set (or several sets)
of times at which software failures were observed, say A = {t , t ,...,t }




,. . . ,t. } for each level of severity i ) .
For the identification phase of the procedure, the reliability analyst
relies on theoretical principles, physical considerations, and previous ex-
periments to rationalize the nature of software failures. Furthermore, the
analyst should arm himself with plots of various empirical functions to
provide clues as to the type of probability functions that might be appro-
priate. The shapes of the relative frequency function for the times between
failures, the empirical reliability function and the empirical failure rate
function, combined with the theoretical considerations and studies of fail-
ures of other software, should suggest an hypothesis about the theoretical
reliability function. That hypothesis must then withstand further statisti-
cal examination. (For a good discussion of the empirical functions, the
reader is directed to GiMEDENKO [9, pp. 78-95].)
Once the analyst has formulated an hypothesis about the reliability
function, or, equivalantly , the probability density of time between failures
or the failure rate function, he must then obtain estimates for the para-
meters of the appropriate functions. For example, if the exponential law,
R(t) = exp(-at) , is suggested, the analyst must obtain an estimate of the
single parameter a . In other cases like the Weibull law, he may have to
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estimate two or more parameters. He is thus led to consider the basic
oroblems of mathematical statistics: (1) the estimation of the values of
unknown distribution parameters and (2) the verification of statistical
hypotheses. The statistical techniaues reauired to solve these problems
can be found in most books on statistical inference or in reliability
books such as LLOYD and LIPOW [15] or GNEDENKO [9].
Once the parameters have been estimated, a test of the hypothesis
is performed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is one of the simpler
and more powerful tests that can be employed to measure the goodness of
fit of the assumed theoretical distribution to the empirical distribution.
If the hypothesis is not rejected by the statistical test, the analyst
then proceeds to estimate the reliability function and to make a prediction
of the software reliability. On the other hand, if the hypothesis is
rejected, another is formulated, and the procedure is repeated.
The "acceptance" of the hypothesis completely determines the
reliability function, for the reliability parameters ) will have already
been obtained. Because statistical estimates of the unknown parameter(s)
are being used, the reliability analyst should provide a confidence interval
for the value(s) of the narameter(s) of the reliability function. To be
conservative, the lower confidence limit on the reliability function
should be utilized in the reliability predictions. On comparing the
predicted reliability with the specified or desired reliability, the analyst
determines whether additional testing and debugging is reauired. The
magnitude of the difference between predicted and specified values should
serve as an indicator about the extent of additional testing (see, for
example, SCHNEIDEWIND [26]).
28
If debugging and additional testing are undertaken the entire procedure
is repeated. Some difficult statistical problems arise at this time because
of the natural reliability growth that accompanies the testing as errors are
detected and corrected. The effect of the reliability growth may be a simple
change in the value(s) of the reliability parameter(s) . On the other hand,
the distributional form of the reliability function may change. For example,
let T be the random variable denoting the time to the next failure, and let
R (t) be the reliability function after a comulative test time of length Sj
Then, let R 2 (t) be the reliability function after a cumulative test time
of length S S . The first case, where only the reliability parametersJ 2 [
change is illustrated by Figure 4; the second case where the form of the




In both figures we observe that the reliability has grown, i.e. R
2
(t) > R-(t)
for all t . This is certainly the objective of additional testing, but the
growth does make the problem of estimating reliability more difficult. The
difficulty arises when the analyst tries to determine what data is to be
used as a basis for the estimation of the "new" reliability function. Because
of the changes with respect to cumulative test time, some of the data set
will probably not be representative of the current state of the process
generating failures. Vie need to test to see if significant changes have taken
place. Suppose, for example, that we have two sets of observed times to
failure, say A_
L
= {t^, t12 >---> tim } and A2 = ^21" " * ft2x? where Ai







The observations of set A were made on a random variable with probability
distribution F (t), and the observations of A were made on a random
variable with probability distribution F
2
(t) . Hopefully, F
1
(t) s F ? (t),
so that the debug period has actually improved the software. There are
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several easy-to-apply statistical tests that can be used to test the
hypothesis that no improvement has taken place; i.e.,
H
Q







1U) a F2 (t)
The nonparametric tests such as the sign tests, Wilcoxon's test and Smirnov's
test are all useful for testing the given hypothesis.
If the statistical tests fail to reject the hypothesis that F (t) = F (t),
all the data can be pooled together to obtain our revised estimate of reliability.
*
However, if there are indications that a change has indeed taken place, we
certainly want to weight the latest data more heavily. If the earlier data are
ignored entirely, the result is a reduced sample size. On the other hand,
if nonrepresentative data areused the resultant reliability predictor may
not be accurate. Research is needed in the area of developing smoothing
techniques for weighting the different sets of failure data.
When the reliability function is revised and the reliability pre-
diction is updated, the prediction is again compared with the desired reliability.
This procedure continues until the predicted reliability reaches the specified
value.
Based on its application to NTDS data, the "hardware-oriented" reliability
approach described in this section appears feasible, (see SCHNEIDEWIND [24].)
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However, the methodology reauires validation against other sets of data
before any general conclusions about the apnroach can be made.
4.3 Error-Counting Models
In the preceding section we pointed out some difficulties which result
from the possible non-homogeneous (time variant) nature of the data collected
over different test periods as software errors are detected and removed. What
is needed is a mathematical model for software reliability which is tailored to
the SDecial characteristics of software failures and which exDlicitly accounts
for the natural growth of software reliability as a function of cumulative
test time. The models presented in this section attempt to fill this need.
Assume that the total number of errors in the software program at the
start of the test period (preferably the integration test period) decreases
directly as errors are corrected. If the cumulative number of errors cor-
rected during debugging is recorded, then the number of remaining errors is
simply the difference between the initial number of errors and the number
corrected. This assumes that no new errors are introduced during debugging.
Let N be the (unknown) initial error count, d the cumulative debugging
time since the start of the test, C(d) the total number of errors corrected
in (0,d) and r(d) the total number of errors remaining in the software
after a cumulative debugging time of length d . Then, it is clear that
r(d) = N - C(d) (4.3.1)







The reliability model that we present is basically that developed by
both SHOOMAN [27], [28] and JELENSKI and MORANDA [10]. Their models assume
that the probability of an error being encountered in a small interval of time
of length At after t hours of successful operation (the failure rate




(t) = K • r(d) (4.3.2)
for some constant of proportionality K . The proportionality constant may
vary from program to program depending perhaps on such factors as the total
number of machine language instructions, the rate of processing instructions,
the software structure and/or the type of test procedure.
We can then write the reliability function (see Appendix) as
t
R(t) = exp( - / Z (X)dX) (4.3.3)
On substituting (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) into (4.3.3) and writing the reliability
function as R(t,d) to indicate its dependence on both t and the debug
time d , we get
R(t,d) = exp( -K(N - C(d)t) (4.3.4)
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We note that (4.3.4) is the exponential reliability model with reliability
parameter a(d) = K(N - C(d)) . Conseauently , the mean time between failures
(as a function of d ) is
MTBF(d) = l/a(d) = 1/K(N - C(d)) (4.3.5)
Since C(d) is assumed known, we must determine only the constants K and
N.
Using the approach of SHOOMAN [28], suppose that out of n total test
runs there are s successful runs and n - s unsuccessful runs. Let T, , T_,...,T
1 d s
represent the hours of success for the s successful runs and t_ , t ,...,t
1 d n-s
the run hours before failure for the n-s unsuccessful runs. Then the
cumulative run hours is
s n-s
H = I T. + It.
1=1 1=1
An estimate of the mean time between failures is then obtained from
the ratio of total run hours to the number of failures
MTBF = 1/a = H/(n-s) (4.3.6)
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The unknown constants N and K can be evaluated by looking at the
estimate (4.3.6) after two different debugging times d < d chosen so
that C(d ) < C(d ) . Using the method of moments, we eauate (4.3.6) for













= 1/K(N - C(d
2 ))
(4.3.8)
where X and X are the number of software failures detected in H and
H hours, respectively, of total run time. The ratio of (4.3.7) to (4.3.8)























The "hats" above the parameters a, N and K indicate that they are
estimates of the parameters. The estimates (4.3.9) and (4.3.10) are simple
functions of the cumulative errors corrected and the sample means 1/a,
and l/a
2
. However, the statistical properties of estimates obtained
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by the method of moments, as were (4.3.9) and (4.3.10), are not as good as
those obtained by the maximum likelihood technique. Solving for the maximum
likelihood estimates (MLE's), we obtain for two tests with n and n runs
and H and H total hours,
(n + n? )/K + (C(d n )H n + C(d p )Hj















Numerical methods are reouired to solve these eouations for N and K , but
the results obtained should be superior to those given by (4.3.9) and (4.3.10).
A single iterative procedure should suffice to solve (4.3.11) and (4.3.12).
First, use (4.3.10) as an initial estimate of K and substitute this value
into (4.3.11) to get an estimate of N . Then substitute this value for
/\ ^
N into (4.3.12) to get a new estimate of K. Repeat this iterative procedure
until successive estimates of N and K do not change. (If N is rounded
to an integer the convergence should be quite rapid.)
Large sample estimates of the variance of the MLE's have been determined
by SH00MAN [28]. They are given by:
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Other reliability models where the failure rate is taken as a function
of the number of errors remaining in the software have been proposed. That
of JELENSKI and MORANDA is basically the same as the above model. They do
obtain different estimators for the constants K and N however. SCHICK
and WOLVERTON [23] assume a model which takes the failure rate to be propor-
tional to the number of remaining errors and which increases with operating
time t
,
Z (t) = A • r(d) • t
where A is a constant of proportionality. This model, which has, for each
fixed d , an increasing failure rate, leads to the Weibull reliability
law. If one views the test operation as a series of different runs which
gradually closes in on the remaining errors, such an assumption of an in-
creasing failure rate is reasonable. However, under normal operation, runs
are not selected to examine exhaustively all possible paths through the entire
range of values for all inputs. Instead, failures are caused when a par-
ticular combination of input data and oath is experienced. Thus, an argument
could also be made that the failure rate is constant and the times between
failures have no "memory". In order to select among the models, tests must
be conducted using actual failure data. One easy way to test the model
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(4.3.2) is to run m operational tests and compute estimates of N and K
for adjacent values d. and d. in . Then, if the constant-failure-ratei 1+1
hypothesis is true, graphs of N vs d and K vs d should appear as
random fluctuations about the horizontal lines through N and K , respectively,
as illustrated in Figure 8. Any deviation from the horizontal pattern would
suggest that the hypothesis is false. If there is no evidence to contradict
the hypothesis, the m sets of data can all be pooled to obtain the estimates






FLUCTUATIONS OF N AND K WITH DEBUG TIME
Figure 8
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Implicit in Model (4.3.4) is the assumption that all time periods of
equal length represent equal intensities of testing and debuggino. In reality,
this is rarely the case because of varying manpower assignments and different
types of testing. JELENSKI and MORANDA [10] and SH00MAN [27] offer refinements
to the basic model to adjust for unequal intensities of testing and debugging.
Their refinements require basically that the previous results be normalized
with respect to manpower and that the time to failure observations be nor-
malized to account for variable exposure rates. The refinements may improve
on the basic model, but, for the most part, the additional data required are
just not available. Consequently, their implementation would require a great
deal of subjectivity by some decision maker.
4.4 An Error-Seeding Model
The preceding reliability models rely strongly on the estimation of
the number of errors remaining in the computer program after various stages
of the testing process. MILLS [19] suggests a rather novel approach for
estimating that quantity. He proposes that software errors be intentionally
introduced at random into a program. The "seeded" errors would then be used
to calibrate the testing process and to estimate the number of remaining
"indiaenous" errors. Althouah it may seem a paradox to introduce errors in
an effort to remove eventually all indigenous errors, such a procedure does
have a firm statistical basis.
Suppose that the software contains n. indigenous errors, and
n errors (seeded errors) are deliberately inserted randomly into the software.
Suppose, further, that a testing process to find and remove errors is undertaken
and that each remaining error - indigenous or seeded - is equally likely to
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be discovered at any point of the testing process. Then, after removing a
total of r errors, the probability that s are seeded errors and r - s
are indigenous errors is given by
/n. + n
,
q (n. + n ) = — £^
—
(4.4.1)
s 1 s ' n .
for s <. n and r <, n. + n . The problem is that n. is unknown.
S 1 S r 1
Let us now see how the probabilities (4.4.1) can be used to give a
simple estimate of n. . First, intuitively, it seems logical that the ratio
of r - s to s should be approximately the same as the ratio of n. to





or n. ^ III . n (4.4.2)
FELLER [6] provides statistical support for the estimate (4.4.2). He shows
that the maximum likelihood estimate of n. is the integer part of (4.4.2)
That is,
\ - [^ • n B ] (4.4.3)
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Example: Suppose that 100 errors are inserted into the software and, in
the ensuing testing, 15 errors, consisting of 10 seeded errors and 5 in-
digenous errors, are found. Then n = 100 , s = 10 and r = 15 . The
maximum likelihood estimate of n. is
n
i
= [IT^ ' 100] = 50
Being only a statistical estimate, the actual number of indigenous errors
may be more or less than 50. We can test the hypothesis H • n. = 50
against the alternative that n. > 50 by using the probability function
(4.4.1) . We would want to reject H only if the number of seeded errors
among the 15 discovered errors were "too small." For example, suppose the
15 discovered errors included only five seeded errors. Then, assuming H
is true, the probability of obtaining five or fewer seeded errors is given
by,
p = q (150) + qjOSO) + ... + q (150)
The probability p is difficult to calculate exactly, but, using the binomial
approximation, we find that p is approximately 0.01 . With such a small
probability, we would be inclined to believe that the number of indigenous
errors is larger than 50.
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In the example, we see that we can obtain the MLE for the number
of indigenous errors, and we can also use the probability function (4.4.1)
to test hypotheses about the magnitude of n. . The test of hypothesis is
complicated, however, by the mathematical difficulties experienced when working
with (4.4.1) . The binomial or normal approximations are only good when
r is small compared to n. + n , but in cases of practical interest we would
like that r be nearly as large as n. + n . Consequently, other procedures
for testing the hypothesis about the number of indigenous errors are desirable.
MILLS discusses a simple procedure for testing the hypothesis that the
number of indigenous errors is less than or equal to k . We outline his
procedure, called the Assert, Insert and Test (AIT) process .
(1) Assert that n. <: k .v i
(2) Insert n seeded errors.
s
(3) Test until all n seeded errors are found and record the
s
number of indigenous errors found, say i .
(4) Compute C(n , k)> the confidence with which the assertion
n. ^ k is rejected, as





I n + k + 1 if i £ k
s
(4.4.4)
The confidence C(n ,k) is the probability that an AIT process will correctly
reject a false assertion and is conservative in the sense that C(n ,k) is the
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powe r of the test evaluated at n. = k + 1 . On observing (4.4.4) it is
obvious that our confidence increases with larger values of n and decreases
with increasing values of k . This is illustrated in Table 1 .
\k
s \ 1 2 3 4
1 .50 .33 .25 .20 .17
2 .67 .50 .40 .33 .29
3 .75 .60 .50 .43 .38
4 .80 .67 .57 .50 .46
5 .83 .71 .62 .56 .50
10 .91 .83 .77 .71 .67
AIT Confidence (i <; k)
Table 1
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MILLS suagests that an AIT chart be maintained to provide a visual
progress report. The chart gives a chronological record of both the maximum
likelihood estimate of the number of indigenous errors and the actual number
of indiaenous errors found. The example below illustrates an AIT chart.
Suppose that the null hypothesis (assertion) is H Q : n. = 4 and
8 errors are seeded Then, if the number of indigenous errors found is greater
than 4 (the total number of errors found is greater than n
s
+ k = 12), H Q can
be rejected with certainty. Let us now suppose that the AIT process produces
the fullowing sequence of errors: S, S, I, S, S, I, I, S, S, S, S where S
represents a seeded error and I an indigenous error. The AIT chart for this








AIT Chart (ns= 8, k = 4, Confidence = 0.62)
Figure 9
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The test succeeded since the MLE curve ended up beneath the horizontal
line n. = 4 . After a while, the MLE curve should appear as random fluctuations
about the horizontal line at heiqht n. with decreasina variance.
i
MILLS' AIT process can be extended easily to allow for different
stoppinq rules other than waitinp until all seeded errors are found. One
useful modification is to stop after a fixed number j of the seeded errors
(j < n ) have been found. If this is the case, the maximum likelihood es-









if i > k
if i ^ k
Other interesting modifications might have the AIT process stop after a fixed
number of errors of either type have been found, or to stop after a fixed
number of indigenous errors have been found. For each modification a new
confidence equation must be determined. Other error-seedina models with
different underlying assumptions have been investigated by LIPOW [13] .
The error-seeding models are intuitively appealing and they have
the advantage of being quite simple computationally. Nevertheless, there
are some problems involved with the insertion of errors. The models assume
that, at each run, all remaining errors are equally likely to be found.
Thus, the errors must be inserted in such a way that the testing process
46
is not biased toward either the seeded errors or the indigenous errors. This
is a nontrivial problem in itself because the nature of the indigenous errors
is unknown. If substantive error data existed the seeded errors could be set
to reflect actual experience. Much research must be done before a methodology
for introducing software errors satisfying the assumptions of the error-
seeding model can be developed. If that problem can be solved, the error-
seedina program offers a powerful tool for validating computer programs.
4.5 A Simple Reliability Model for Qualitative Data
Up to this point we have assumed that data are in the form of times
between failures. Occasionally the data is not of that type, or the time-to-
failure data (quantitative data) has been used solely for the purpose of
classifying a test run as a success or a failure. Such a classification may
be necessary because the form of the mathematical model which describes times-
to-failureis unknown or intractable. Another reason may be that it is costly
or simply not feasible to install the recording equipment or hire observers
to monitor the software continuously as needed to obtain the variable data.
Thus, we may have to be satisfied with counting the number of failures in
a given number of test runs or the number of failures during test intervals
of a given length of time.
If we are reasonably confident that the quantitative data follow a
known, simple, mathematical form, we should use the quantitative data for
estimating reliability. The quantitative data allow for more precise ob-
servation and make more efficient use of the information available. This
efficient use of data is of increasing importance as experimentation becomes
more and more costly. Nevertheless, if the quantitative data is not available,
we must make do with what we can get. Reliability can still be demonstrated when
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qualitative data is used. Suppose, for example, that the required failure-
free time of operation is T and several runs are made for T units of time
noting only whether each run was a success or a failure. Then, the simple
binomial distribution can be used to estimate the reliability. Other reliability
models depending on qualitative data will be described in this section.
We allow some flexibility in the classification of a run as a success
or a failure. A success may mean zero software failures of any type; it may
mean no software failures of a given critical ity or worse; it may mean that
the total number of failures is not greater than some given number; or it
may be taken to mean whatever the user desires. We assume that the user
has settled on a definition of success and on a definition of "test run".
We now describe some reliability models which make use of qualitative
data. They are somewhat heuristic models which, in some cases, require a
subjective assessment of the test runs. First, we describe a ^jery general
model proposed by Mac WILLIAMS [17] . Then we look at some special cases.
Suppose that N test runs are conducted and let n. be the number
of failures observed in test i . Let E.(n.) be a measure of the performance11 r
f"h
durina the i test and let W.(n.) be a weiohtino factor which reflects11
+ h
seriousness of the errors observed in the i test. We require that
and
£ E.(n.) ^ 1 , E (0) = 1






R = A I E (n .) • W.(n.) (4.5.2)
to be an estimate of the reliability.
If we take E.(n) = for all n > and W.(n) =1 for n * ,
we obtain the special case where reliability is estimated to be the frac-
tion of successful runs. For example, if in 100 test runs 85 were successful,
we would estimate the reliability to be R = 0.85 .
As another example, suppose that failures have been classified according
to severity as low, medium and high. Let E.(n.) = 1 for all n. , and
let the weights given to low, medium and high severity errors be 0.9, 0.1
and respectively. Define W.(n.) to be the product of the weights assigned
to the n. errors and W.(0) = 1 . For example, if test i results in
2 low severity errors and 1 medium severity error, then n. = 3 and
W.(n.j) = (0.9)(0.9)(0.1) = .081 . In this case the reliability model (4.5.2)
lets the user weight errors according to their impact on the performance of
the software.
The flexibility of (4.5.2) makes it particularly attractive. Test
personnel are not "locked" into complete objectivity. Instead, they are
allowed to interject their subjective assessment of software performance.
This allows personnel to adapt the model to their particular needs. The
model (4.5.2) could even be used when quantitative data are available if
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it were desirable to weinht subjectively the quality of each test run
in a series of runs.
4.6 A Reliability Growth Model for Qualitative Data
The reliability qrowth model (4.3.4) which utilized times-to-failure
data allowed us to account for the natural growth of reliability that takes
place as errors are detected and corrected. We now discuss a model which
relies on qualitative data and which explicitly accounts for the reliability
growth. The model is one developed for hardware systems by BARLOW and
SCHEUER [1 ], but it appears to be adaptable to software.
We consider a trial to be a test run of length T . Imagine a testing
J. L.
program which consists of K stages with n. trials at the i stage.
Both K and the n. 's are completely arbitrary, therefore, no control over
the length of a sampling interval is required. Each trial is considered to
be a success or a failure. At the end of each of the k stages, an effort
is made to determine the cause of each failure and to correct the software
so that the failure will not reoccur. We allow for the possibility that
the causes of some failures may escape our detection. Consequently, those
failures might reappear. Using the terminology of BARLOW and SCHEUER, we
classify failures as "assignable-cause" or "inherent" failures depending
on whether the cause is determined and removed or not. For each stage,
we record the number of inherent failures X., the number of assignable-cause
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FAILURE RECORD DURING K-STAGE PROGRAM
Figure 10
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Define q to be the probability of an inherent failure during a trial
(a run of length T) . Since no corrections are made of these failures,
q is assumed constant throughout the K-stage test program. On the
other hand, the probability of assignable-cause failures should decrease
from one stage to the next since the causes are assumed to be removed.
Let q. be the probability of an assignable-cause failure in the i stage
We assume that q. ^ q for i = 2, ..., K . The probability of success
for a trial, the reliability for time T , is
R. = 1 - q - q. .
1 no n i
The probability of X. inherent failures, A. assignable-cause failures
+ h
and S. successes in X. + A. + S. total trials durina the i stage is
i ill
given by the multinomial probability function
(X. + A. + S.)! X. A. S.
1 1 1 1„ 1/1 n « N 1
X.! A,! S.! q o \ (1 " q o " q i } '
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K (X + A + S )! X A
s
From (4.6,1) the maximum likelihood estimators of q
n
and q. are easily
shown to be
K K







q. = (1 - q )A./(A. + S.) (4.6.3)H ^0 111
for i = 1, 2,... , K .
Instead of the estimates q. we want the maximum likelihood estimates of
th e q. 's subject to the restriction that q ^ q„ ^ . . . s: q^ . Let q.
be the MLE of q. subject to this condition. Then, BARLOW and SCHEUER
show that
A +. . .+ A
q . = (1 - q ) max min
-j^^j-^^i (A + ^j (4.6.4)
u z i r <; l
v
r r v u u'
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Equation (4.6.4) gives an explicit expression for q. . However, in
practice one would probably want to determine the q". 's using the following
equivalent procedure. If q ^ q s . . . ;> q then q~. = q . for i = 1, 2,
. .., K . If q. < q 4j _ for some j , then combine the observations in
J J +1
the j and (j + 1) stages and compute the NILE of the q.'s by
(4.6.3) for the K - 1 stages thus formed. Continue this procedure until
the estimates of the q.'s form a non-increasing sequence. These estimates
are the maximum likelihood estimates of the q.'s subject to q n s q~ ;>
i 1 2
...* qK •
Example : A software test program consisting of six stages was conducted.
Each stage was terminated when the number of assignable-cause failures
reached three. At the conclusion of each stage, a debug effort eliminated
the source of all assignable -cause failures so that the software was
different in each succeeding stage, but homogeneous within any given
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TOTALS 4 18 Tr 80
SIX STAGE TEST RESULTS
Table 2
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The MLE of q Q
does not depend on the groupings of the data into stages




- I X / I n = 4/80 = .05
i=l i=l
To determine the MLE of the q.'s subject to the restriction that they
be non -increasing we agaregate those stages where the non -increasingness
is violated until a non -increasing sequence is obtained. Since the estimate
of q is not staae dependent, it suffices to look at the ratios A. /(A. + S.)
^0 r 111
Observe from Table 2 that there is a reversal in non-increasingness from
staae three to stage four. That is, q, > q . Therefore we combine stages
three and four and aet a new estimate
A + A
U





We now have the new sequence of ratios:
3/4, 1/2, 6/19, 3/14, 3/33
which has the required non -increasing property. Therefore the MLE's of
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the q-'s , subject to the non-increasinn condition, are
q^ = (.95)(3/4) = .713 q^ = (.95)(6/19) = .300
q"
2
= (.95)0/2) = .475 q
5
= (.95)(3/14) = .202
q"
3
= (.95)(6/19) = .300 q 6 = (.95) (3/33) = .086
The MLE of the reliability of the software in its last test stage is
R
6 1 - qo
- q 6
= 0.864
If all test staces were incorrectly assumed to be homogeneous and all
data pooled together, the estimate of reliability, makina no distinction
between assianable-cause failure and inherent failure, vould be
6 6
K = I S./ [ n. = 48/80 = 0.60
i=l i=l
We see that consideration of the reliability growth has a substantial
impact on the estimate of reliability.
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BARLOW and SCHEUER also derive a lower confidence bound for software
reliability. They show that a 100(1 -a) percent lower confidence bound
on R.. , the software reliability in its final configuration, havina
observed S. successes in n. trials at staoe i , is found by settino
i i - J -
K K
S = y S. and n = 7 n.
.i u
i=l i=l




* 1 -a . (4.6.6)
The value R is easily found using binomial tables. R is the desired
* *
confidence bound in the sense that
P[R
K
;> R | R s R ss . . . * iy * 1 - a .
BARLOW and SCHEUER also show that the bound is the best that can be achieved
under our assumptions of non -decreasing values of the R.'s . In the a tove
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examDle, the 95% lower confidence interval for R^ is given by
R = 0.803
In this reliability growth model we have allowed for the possibility
that some errors may go uncorrected. There is, of course, no requirement
that any "inherent" failures occur. Indeed, it is to be expected that most
causes can be determined and the source of the troubles removed. Most
likely, if any inherent errors do exist, they are those rare objects which
are not observed until most assignable-cause errors have been removed.
4.7 Bayesian Reliability Models
We complete our treatment of software reliability models with a brief
discussion of Bayesian reliability models. The Bayesian approach has been
widely used to develop reliability models for hardware systems. The approach
would also seem to be applicable for software reliability.
Suppose we have collected the data t , t , ... , t representing the
times between failures for the first n observed software failures. We
want to make an inference about the distribution of the time to the (n + 1)
f"h
failure. Let the random variable T. be the run time between the (i - 1)
and the i failures and let T. and T. be independent for all i f j .
Let f(t|\(i)) be the probability density function for T. with parameter
A(i) . We write the parameter as a function of i to allow for changes
that may occur as errors are removed. If one supposes that x(i) is a
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failure-rate parameter and the software is debugged after each failure occurs,
then one would expect that A(i) ;> A(i + 1) (the failure rate is non -increasing)
Let a(ji|i,6) be the probability density function for the random variable
A(i), where 3 is a parameter (or vector of parameters). The Bayesian
approach treats the parameter 3 as though it were a random variable. The
analyst begins with a "prior" distribution for 3 , expressed by the density
function h (3) and then uses the failure data to update the prior and
obtain a "posterior" distribution hA&) . Using the Bayes' Theorem, the




J\ J f(t.|A)g(A|i,3)dA • h (3)
_ i=± i o
I lit J f(t i |A)g(A|i,3)dA • hQ (3)]d3
i=l
Ha ving obtained the posterior probability function h (3) , the probability
density function of A(n+1) and T . are then found to beJ ' n+l





|X(n+l)) = / f(t
n+1 |£)a(£|n + l)d£
The integrals above (all taken to range over the interval (-°° , °° ) )
appear to be rather awesome mathematically. Indeed, the mathematical
difficulties and the problem of choosing an appropriate prior distribution for
3 have impeded the acceptance of the Bayesian approach. Nevertheless, for
some special cases of practical interest, the mathematics works out quite











Where ip(i) is assumed to be a known monotonically .increasing function.
(Software repairs are undertaken after each observed failure). Assuming






/ a N n+1
a + ln(l/k j)
*here k. = ^(i)/(ip(i) + t.)
,
i = 1, 2, ..., n + 1 and









- 1 - F(t
n+1 )
.
THOMPSON and WALSH [2 9] also have applied the Bayesian approach to the
software reliability problem. Instead of looking at the failure rate or
the time-to-failure distribution, they apply the approach directly to the
reliability function. That is, they treat the true but unknown reliability
function, R , as a random variable whose probability function is obtained
from Bayes Theorem using test data. Let P(R) be the prior density of the
reliability which has been obtained subjectively. Also, let R be the
estimate of the reliability obtained from the test data and let g(R|R)
be the conditional density of the estimate R given that the reliability
is R . Then, from Bayes Theorem, the posterior density of the reliability
R is
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Integratinq (4.7.1), ve pet the distri bution function
F(R) = /
R f(X|R)dX (4.7.2)
From (4.7.2) Bayesian confidence limits on reliability can then be obtained
For example, the lower 100(1 - a)% confidence limit is that value R nr l-a
such that F( R
i )
=
1 - a . THOMPSON and WALSH present two special cases
one using qualitative data and the other quantitative data. In the first
case, they assume that the probability of a software failure over a given
test interval is constant and that in n runs s were successes.
Taking R = s/n and a uniform prior distribution p(R) , they show that
the posterior density of R is the beta density
r>S/T n\n-Sf(R|R) = ! R b (l-R)
$(s+l, n-(s+l))
where
3(s + 1, n - (s+ 1)) - (n + ] ) !
s!(n - s)!
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In the second case they assumed a constant failure rate and used as their
estimate of reliability
R(t) = exp(- rt/T)
where T is the total run time and r is the number of failures. Again
using a uniform prior, they show that
f(R(t)
|
R(t)) = J±±JJ±)^L- Rf/t (ln 1/R) r
r(l + r)
At present, the Bayesian approach seems to suffer in comparison to
the simplicity of the other approaches we have presented. In addition, it
requires the subjective assessment of the analyst in determining the prior
distributions. The Bayesian models require more structure than do the
other models. For these reasons, the Bayesian models do not appear to be
as useful as some of the others we have considered.
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V. GUIDELINES FOR SOFTWARE QUALITY ASSURANCE
5 .1 Introduction
We have discussed testing, and several methods for estimating software
reliability have been presented. For the most part, these methods are most
useful for the operational tests which are conducted by the user or some
independent test agency after the integration stage of software development.
However, they are also appropriate for use at the earlier stages where it
may be desirable to estimate module or process reliability or to give guide-
lines on the amount of additional testing that should be given a certain
portion of the software. Nevertheless, it is usually the case in actual
practice that the software delivered to the customer is full of bugs. This
is true even though the software developer may have been required to demon-
strate through some sort of formal qualifying test that his product performs
as specified.
The delivery of unreliable software to the customer results in his loss
of confidence in the product. The customer finds himself forced to conduct
extensive testing to increase its reliability, or to put the unreliable soft-
ware into use and correct the errors in the time-honored fashion of fixing
them as they appear. Neither of these alternatives is satisfactory to the
user. He feels that the developer is better equipped to correct software
errors and that it is the developers job to release a reliable product. It
is not unreasonable for the user to feel this way.
What is needed is that more effort be tunneled in the direction of
ensuring that proper management techniques be performed early in the devel-
opment of the software so that the user is not forced to accept less than
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what he bought. Since part of the problem results from poor programming
practices, research is also needed in the development of tools which enable
a programmer to write better software.
5.2 Design for Reliability
One way to improve the quality of software is to expend more effort
and resources in its design. If causes of software unreliability can be
determined, then steps can be taken to alleviate the contributions of those
causes. Testing and debugging alone cannot ever guarantee completely
reliable software for hidden errors can sometimes violate the system with-
out ever giving a warning (no failures are observed). DIJKSTRA [4] has
remarked, "Testing can be used to show the presence of bugs but never to
show their absence." What, then, can be done in the design area that will
reduce the number of errors written into the software?
TSICHRITZIS and BALLARD [31] suggest that the software can be struc-
tured in such a way as to enhance its reliability. First, a study of the
relative frequencies of different types of errors in programs could identify
the most frequent characteristic errors. This information would then, in
turn, be used to determine the program structures and languages which are
most reliable. Those structures which are unreliable should be avoided,
when possible, by programmers. Next, the software could be structured so
as to allow easier and more complete testing. This could be accomplished
by building up the software from modules and using protection mechanisms
which establish boundaries and rules to restrict communication between the
various modules. The object of the protection mechanism is to minimize
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interface problems. By controlling the interactions between the various
parts of the software, the protection system would tend to isolate errors
so that an error which occurs in one part cannot damage the other parts.
The system would create "fire walls" which would facilitate the recovery
from failures. In addition, the protection system would aid in the dis-
covery and location of errors. This would happen because of the failures
that result from an attempt to violate some protection mechanism.
Software testing at the lowest level of the software hierarchy can
often be nearly exhaustive in the sense that all logic paths of control
can (and should) be checked at least once. Testing the individual paths
with sample inputs covering the extreme values in the domain of the vari-
ables will provide a good start on assuring good quality. Historically,
the trouble with modular test approach has been that problems result when
the modules (processes) are integrated so that they must interact with other-
modules (processes). However, if a good protection system could be devel-
oped the interaction problems would be minimized and modular testing would
be feasible. Then, the software could be designed and structured so that
the modules can be verified independently of the higher levels and then
used without further testing to verify the next level. Because of the re-
duction in the number of tests that would be required, huge savings in both
time and dollars could be achieved if validation could be accomplished by
testing modules independently. For example, suppose module i has n paths
to test and module i is called from m places in module j . If the
modules can be tested independently, we need only test n paths in module i
and m paths in module j , a total of m + n paths. However, if they
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must be combined for testing, n x m paths must be checked. When one
considers that n and m may range upwards into the hundreds or thou-
sands, the potential savings are obvious.
Since its inception, programming has been considered an art rather
than a science. Much work is needed to develop a set of conceptual and
operational principles that constitute good programming practice so that
programming can be placed under tighter control. Considering the current
high cost of reliability, concentration in this area may offer the highest
ratio of benefits to cost.
5.3 The User's Role in Software Development
Unless programming becomes more of a science, the user will have lit-
tle control over actual programming practice. However, there is much that
the user can do to improve the quality of the software he receives. As
more and more large software subsystems are developed and lessons learned
from the successes and failures of the development programs, practices
which constitute good software control are evolving. Software acquirers
are recognizing the value of their practical experience with software devel-
opment and have begun to share their experiences, both good and bad, in the
open literature (see, for example, BUCKLEY [2] , KEEZER [11], COUTINHO [3],
or ELLINGSON [5]). In the time-honored fashion of trial and error many
guidelines have developed.
Official guidelines for government agencies involved as acquirers in
the software development process are given by two documents, MIL-STD-490
( Specification Practices) and MIL-STD-483 ( Configuration Management Practices
of Sys terns , Equipment , Munitions and Computer Programs ). The Specification
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Practices document establishes the detailed format and content of speci-
fications for computer programs. It includes both a Computer Program
Development Specification and a Product Specification. The development
specification describes the performance requirements necessary to design
and verify the computer program in terms of performance criteria. The
product specification is the document representation of the computer pro-
gram; it consists of the flow charts and narrative that logically describe
the computer program, the coding and the data. The Configuration Management
standard expands on the documentation requirements and provides uniform
procedures for preparing, formating and processing changes to computer pro-
grams once a configuration is fixed.
Although certainly deserving of much attention, we shall not attempt
to discuss extensively the steps a software acquirer can and should take
to assure receipt of a quality product. Such an important subject is
better discussed by people who have practical experience such as those
cited above. Nevertheless, we shall focus on a few areas which fall under
the responsibility of the software acquirer and which have a potentially
large impact on the quality of the software.
Many of the problems that result can be traced to the very outset
of the software development program. Too often the customer, who is res-
ponsible for establishing detailed performance specifications, will write
vague statements as to what he wants. This forces the contractor to guess
at what is wanted or allows him too much freedom for personal interpreta-
tion of what is desired. The performance specifications should be much
more than mere expressions of good intentions. They must describe exactly
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those functions that must be performed, and they must contain enough infor-
mation to enable a contractor to transform an operational need or system
requirement into a design specification. At the same time, overall soft-
ware test plans must be written at the same level of detail. These form
the basis for the development of future test plans and procedures. T he
test plans should require that each performance requirement of each compu-
ter program configuration end-item be verified in some appropriate manner,
and they should specify the acceptance criteria. Detailed and complete
test plans not only give the contractor something to shoot for, but they
also provide the contractor's personnel with specific tests against which
they can check their work as they progress with the coding.
In order to improve visibility, the customer must require configura-
tion management control and detailed documentation. This allows the custo-
mer to monitor the progress in the development of the product and to iden-
tify and control changes to be made to an already approved specification.
Further, it enables management to see what they are managing. The documen-
tation requirement is necessary because it fosters better communication,
and documentation is itself an important part of the software end product.
We have already discussed some of the problems experienced by test
personnel during operational testing caused by the lack of an overall ac-
cepted methodology of software testing. The same problems thwart the suc-
cess of the verification testing conducted by the contractor. Traditionally,
contractors have attempted to verify that the software performs according to
specifications by demonstrating its performance using "canned" tests with
exactly-prescribed inputs. The problem is that the software passes the formal
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verification tests, but it often will fail to process properly other inputs
under varying load conditions. Consequently, when the entire system under-
goes operational testing numerous problems surface. A partial solution to
this problem reverts to the proper writing of performance specifications
and test plans and procedures. Much thought needs to be given to the accep-
tance criteria that are written into the software contract. The customer
must state explicitly how the contractor must verify each performance speci-
fi cation.
Because software is a much less tangible product than is hardware,
the customer must obtain visibility into the contractor's efforts from the
very beginning of the contract. Although there is little that can be ob-
served or inspected in order to assess intermediate progress, the customer
should strive to actively participate in the development by furnishing
guidance to the contractor during design reviews and software testing. The
customer should obtain sufficient visibility to enable him to ensure that
the contractor establishes and enforces good management control and proce-
dures.
Lastly, even with active participation by the customer and the best
management, the delivered software will not be perfect. Therefore, the
customer must expect to require some maintenance after he accepts the product,
and he should provide for the contractor to be kept on the job for some
period after acceptance to correct problems as they occur.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have looked at some of the problems experienced in
the computer software development process. We have pointed out the impor-
tance of software quality assurance and the necessity for keeping close
tabs on the software quality. Using the natural analogies between software
and hardware, we have defined a measure of effectiveness. Test procedures
and data collection requirements have been described.
Several mathematical models which convert the raw software failure
data into estimates of software reliability have been presented. The mathe-
matical models cover different types of failure data and, in some cases,
yield not only point estimates of reliability, but also estimates of the
number of errors remaining in the software subsystem (or a part of that sub-
system) and confidence intervals for reliability. The models represent a
survey of the state of the art in reliability estimation. With only a few
exceptions, they have not been validated with actual software failure data.
They are presented here because they appear to the author to be mathemati-
cally plausible and intuitively appealing. Nevertheless, they have not yet
passed the "acid test" -- good performance in actual use. Consequently,
much work remains to be done before any particular one can be recommended
strongly. We do recommend that software data of the form described in this
report be collected and the various models be tested against real data.
In addition to the need for a validation effort on the reliability
models, we have identified other areas related to the software problem which
cry out for further work. For example, work needs to be done to identify
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unreliable program structures and to develop a set of operational princi-
ples that constitute good programming practice, so that better software
will be written. Also, there is a need for the development of a method-
ology for software testing. This is critical when one considers the huge
portion of total software development costs which are consumed by the test
effort.
Finally, we have pointed out some "management" responsibilities of
the software customer which can have a significant impact on the quality
of the product he is delivered. At the outset he is responsible for the
writing of contractual performance specifications, test plans and proce-
dures, and acceptance criteria. Much work needs to be done in this area
to head off those problems which result because specifications, plans and
requirements contain too little detail. After the customer has written
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APPENDIX
A brief summary of the more important terms associated with mathe-
matical reliability theory is presented in the following for those readers
unfamiliar with that theory.
Reliability .
The reliability of a product is defined as the probability that the
product will function within specified limits for at least a specified
period of time under specified environmental conditions.
Various probability distributions are required for the study of re-
liability. Of fundamental importance is the probability distribution of
the time to fai lure.
Time-to-Fai lure Distribution,
Let f(t) be the probability density of the time to failure of the
product, that is the probability that the product will fail between times
t and t + At is given by f(t) • At . The probability that the product




which is sometimes called the "unreliability" function.
Reliability Function .
The probability that the product will survive to time t is given by
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the reliability function
R(t) = 1 - F(t)
Note the relationships between f(t)
,
F(t) and R(t) . In particular
f(t) = dF(t)/dt = - dR(t)/dt
Instantaneous Failure Rate
.
Another probability function which is convenient for use in relia-
bility studies is the conditional probability that the product will fail
in the interval (t,t+AtJ given that the product has survived to time t .
Mathematically, this probability is given by
(F(t+At) - F(t))/R(t)
On dividing by the length of the interval, At , and taking the limit as
At goes to zero we get the instantaneous failure rate or hazard rate
7(+\ = lim F(t+At) - F(t) 1 dF(t)/dtL[Z)
At->0 At * ~R(tT R[tT
Using the identities involving f(t)
,
F(t) and R(t) we get the following








This differential equation can be solved for R(t) to yield
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R(t) = exp(- Z(s)ds)
,
JO
and since Z(t) = f(t)/R(t) we get
f(t) = Z(t) exp(- Z(s)ds) (Al)
Expression Al shows how the time to failure density is related to the in-
stantaneous failure rate function.
Mea n Time to Failure.
A measure of effectiveness often required in reliability studies is
the mean time to failure (MTTF). This is easily found by taking the first
moment of the time to failure distribution. In terms of the density f(.t)
,
MTTF = tf(t)dt
An equivalent expression giving the MTTF in terms of the reliability function
is
r°°
MTTF = R(t)dt .
The Exponential Model
.
In many reliability studies the product reaches a point in its life
cycle where the failure rate is constant, that is,
Z(t) = a , a >
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On substituting into equation Al we get the time-to-failure density
f( t) = a exp(-ut) t >





An important property of the exponential model is its "loss of memory."
In woras, this means that the probability that the product will survive an
additional tQ units of time does not depend on the amount of time the pro-
duct has already been in operation. Mathematically, if T is the time-to-












The exponential model is easily the most widely applied model in relia-
bility analyses. There are several reasons for its acceptability. First,
its theoretical properties such as constant failure rate and loss of memory
often seem appropriate for describing the probabilistic characteristics of
the failures of some products. Indeed, many theoretical investigations and
experimental verifications have shown that, for some products, the time-to-
failure density is f(t) = a exp(-at) . In the second place, the popularity
of the exponential model is often due to its simplicity. It has only a




Recently, the exponential model has been the subject of criticism
because it is being accepted uncritically. Analysts must attempt to jus-
tify its use on the basis of the nature of the failures of the product
under consideration. In many cases failures are described quite well by
the exponential model, but there are also many cases where it is not
appropriate.
The Wei bull Model
.
While the assumption of a constant failure rate is often appropriate
for describing chance failures, it is not always sufficient. This particu-
larly true during the early "burn-in" stage and the late "wear-out" stage.
Nor would the constant failure rate be appropriate during a period of re-
liability growth due to improvements in the product. Thus, other mathema-
tical functions are required so that increasing or decreasing failure rates





; t > ; a,3 > .
When 3 < 1 the failure rate decreases with time; if 3 > 1 it increases




exp(-at 6 ) t >
This density is called the Weibull density. The reliability function is
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given by
R(t) = exp(-at3 ) .
Like the exponential model, the Weibull enjoys widespread use. It
can also be justified on theoretical grounds, for it has been shown that
the limiting distribution (as n-*") of the time to failure of the mini-
mum of n independent random variables each having the same distribution
is described by the Weibull law. Perhaps more than any other reason, the
Weibull model has been used because it is so versatile. The Weibull faimly
is so rich that some member of the family can usually be found to describe
the nature of failures for most products.
Other Models.
Other probability functions which have been found useful for describing
the random nature of failures are the gamma and the lognormal. These func-
tions are represented by:




Lognormal: f(t) = — exp(-ln (t-a) 2 /26 2 ); 6 >
2i\ 8t
For appropriate choices of parameters, these functions can be made to repre-
sent either increasing or decreasing failure rates.
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